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STRUGGLING WITH TEXT AND CONTEXT:
A HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO
INTERPRETING AND REALIZING LAW
SCHOOL MISSIONS
FRANK S. RAVITCH*
INTRODUCTION
Why do some law schools have missions that exist on paper
but not in reality, while others have lived missions that do not
match their written missions to one degree or another? It seems
that some schools find it difficult to effectuate their missions in
varying social and temporal contexts.1 This article explores one
possible method for understanding and addressing this
phenomenon. It is intended to illuminate the interpretive
difficulties that may occur when a law school with changing
social, economic, and intellectual situations seeks to implement
its stated mission over a period of time. This article will also
address the often unstated impact those difficulties have on
whether a school "lives" its mission, simply acknowledges it, or
falls somewhere in between. Lastly, this discussion will focus on
ways in which these interpretive difficulties can be overcome so
that a law school can live its mission over time, without ignoring
the realities facing the school, its faculty, administration, staff,
and students. While the focus will be on religiously affiliated
law schools, the suggestions contained herein are equally
applicable to secular law schools struggling to follow their
mission statements.
* Visiting Associate Profesor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (2001-
2002); Fulbright Scholar, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University (Spring/Summer
2001); Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law.
I One of the themes at the First Conference of the Religiously Affiliated Law
Schools was the complex challenges these schools face both internally and
externally in regard to their goals and missions. See generally Steven M. Barkan,
The First Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Overview, 78 MARQ.
L. REV. 247 (1995). Moreover, through experience in academics, most of us are
aware of a number of schools in this situation.
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Given the internal and external pressures facing law schools
as we enter the new millennium, it is not surprising that some
schools are not effectively carrying out their mission
statements.2  This failure can be better understood and
addressed through hermeneutic theory; more specifically,
through the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, as augmented by the work of Paul Ricoeur.3 I have
been working with hermeneutic theory recently in my research
on the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and when
thinking about this symposium, the potential relevance of that
theory to law school mission statements was inescapable.
For those not familiar with hermeneutic theory, this article
will first explain the basic concepts of that theory as understood
by Gadamer and Ricoeur. Particular attention will be paid to
the interplay between the text and the interpreter in the process
of interpretation.4 Next, hermeneutic theory will be applied to
suggest why some law schools are unable or unwilling to
effectuate their written mission statements over time. Finally,
2 See id. at 250-53.
3 There are a number of primary and secondary texts that set forth and discuss
Gadamerian hermeneutics. Perhaps most important is Gadamer's magnum opus,
HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., The Crossroad Pub. Corp. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) [hereinafter
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. Two of Gadamer's other works are worth
consulting for a discussion on his approach to hermeneutics. See HANs-GEORG
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed. & trans., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1976) [hereinafter GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS]; HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick G. Lawrence trans.,
The MIT Press 1981) (1979) [hereinafter GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF
SCIENCE]. In addition to Gadamer's work, there are a number of valuable books that
can serve as introductions to the subject. See, e.g., JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION
TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (Joel Weinsheimer trans., Yale Univ. Press
1994) (1991); JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS
METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980). Two excellent
sources for Ricoeur's work in hermeneutics are PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1981) (1981) [hereinafter RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES] and
PAUL RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION (Richard Kearney ed. & trans.,
Sage Publications 1996) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION].
Examples of sources addressing legal hermeneutics include: LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) [hereinafter LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS] and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990).
4 See generally, GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 186
(explaining that interpretation involves a dialogue between text and interpreter).
This dialogue will be addressed in Part I of this article.
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this article will suggest that by understanding the role of both
the text (the mission statement) and the interpreter (the law
school administration, faculty, students, etcetera) in interpreting
and effectuating a law school's mission statement, a law school
can carry out its mission in a way that both maintains the "core
values" of the mission statement and remains functional in the
ever-evolving law school environment.
Two things should be underscored at this juncture. First,
the hermeneutic theory I am working with in this article is not a
methodology for reaching objective meaning.5 Those familiar
with the term have seen it in the context of biblical
hermeneutics, 6  historical hermeneutics,7  or romanticist
hermeneutics,8  which imply the possibility of a clear
methodology to reach objective interpretations. 9  An
underpinning of Gadamerian theory is that there is no absolute
methodology for interpretation. Instead, interpretation is a
result of the interaction between the text and the interpreter
seeking to understand the text.'0 While Ricoeur's approach
differs from Gadamer's in many ways,"1 the two approaches
compliment one another in the present context and in their
relation to legal thought.
5 Gadamer rejects the idea that one can use any specific methodology to
understand a text or glean an objective meaning. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD, supra note 3, at 476 (arguing that "objectifying procedures of natural
science ... [appear] to be an abstraction when viewed from the medium that
language is"). But see GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 118 ("[Ufnderstanding what is said
cannot be reduced to a cognizing subject's intellectual comprehension of an
objectivizable, isolable content.").
6 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 11-13 (providing a basic overview of the
history of biblical hermeneutics); see also RUDOLF BULTMANN, FAITH AND
UNDERSTANDING (Robert W. Funk ed. & Louise Pettibone Smith trans., SCM Press
Ltd. 1969) (1966) (addressing Bultmann's theological hermeneutics, which while
addressing biblical issues, are more appropriately considered an aspect of modem
philosophical hermeneutics).
7 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 16-26 (providing a basic overview of historical
hermeneutics); see also Eskridge, supra note 3, at 619-20 (discussing Gadamer's
critique of historicism).
8 BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 13-16 (providing a brief overview of romanticist
hermeneutics and discussing the important role of Schleiermacher who inspired
Dilthey, one of the most important hermeneutic theorists). Dilthey played a
significant role in regard to historical hermeneutics. See id. at 19-23.
9 See id. at 11-26.
10 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3; see also GRONDIN, supra
note 3, at 106-37 (providing an overview of Gadamer's work in this area); Eskridge,
supra note 3, at 614-24 (same).
11 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 229-35.
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Second, this article might prove most relevant to schools
that have had trouble realizing their missions, or have failed to
do so. It should be particularly useful to those schools that have
abandoned any realistic attempt to live their mission statements
because those statements seem out of touch with current
realities, and have thus become simply lofty goals or
inspirational statements with little practical significance. There
are, of course, schools that are able to effectuate their missions
daily-I happen to teach at one now. It appears that these
schools engage in some of the give and take that I will discuss
below, 12 at least implicitly, in order to realize their missions over
time. Even for these schools, the approaches discussed below
can be useful to help perpetuate this success. Of course, as will
be seen, the nature of the mission statement itself plays an
important role in facilitating or complicating this process.'3
I. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TEXT AND CONTEXT:
GADAMER, RICOEUR, AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING
The purpose of this section is to provide a basic overview of
Gadamerian and Ricoeurian hermeneutics. 14  Continental
philosophy can be difficult to penetrate for those with little
formal training-as this author has personally experienced. It is
part of a discourse that might, at first, seem alien to many law
professors and lawyers. One of the goals of this section is to
bridge this potential gap. Bridging the gap is well worth the
effort given the major contribution this branch of philosophy has
to offer, both in terms of the issues discussed herein and other
issues of concern within the legal and academic communities. 15
In this article, I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive
discussion of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics or Ricoeur's
hermeneutic theory. Gadamer's thought is focused on a
universal concept of "being" far beyond the scope of this article,16
12 See infra Part I.A.
13 See infra Parts I.C, I.
14 It might be more accurate to say that the purpose of this section is to provide
a basic overview of Gadamerian hermeneutics and to explore those portions of
Ricoeur's work that mediate some major criticisms of Gadamerian hermeneutics.
See infra Part I.B. As will be explained, Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory is much
broader than this. See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra
note 3; RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION, supra note 3, at 51-53.
15 See LEGAL HERMENEUTICs, supra note 3; see also Eskridge, supra note 3.
16 See generally GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3 (providing a
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although his construct of interpretation, discussed below, is
central to his broader work.' 7 Ricoeur's hermeneutics involves a
melding of phenomenology and hermeneutic theory that also
seeks a broad concept of understanding; this melding, however,
cannot be addressed or explained adequately in this brief
article.' 8 Instead, I will focus on how Ricoeur helps explain and
mediate some of the concerns raised by Gadamer's theory-
specifically, the concerns raised by Jiirgen Habermas.' 9
A. Gadamer
Gadamer suggests that there is no absolute method of
interpretation.20 Each interpreter brings his or her own pre-
understandings into the act of interpreting a text or a
situation. 21 Moreover, these pre-understandings are influenced
by the tradition and social context in which the interpreter
exists.22 This tradition provides the interpreter with a horizon
that includes both her obvious predispositions and a range of
more subtle ones.23 This horizon can be influenced by many
factors, including the social context in which interpretation
occurs and the social bias and personal traits of the interpreter-
all of which are influenced by tradition.24
more in-depth discussion on this subject); see also GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 106-39
(providing an outstanding overview of Gadamerian hermeneutics).
17 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3. The term "universal" as
used in this context should not be confused with "foundational." See id. at 256-57,
350-51 (discussing Heidegger's fundamental ontology and universality of experience
respectively).
18 See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 3;
RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION, supra note 3.
19 See PAUL RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, in
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 63 [hereinafter
RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology].
20 See generally GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 471, 522, 533-
34; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, in GADAMER,
REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 88, 105 [hereinafter GADAMER,
Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy].
21 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 265-71. Gadamer
suggests that "[tihe concept of prejudice' is where [one] can start" when developing
his or her own hermeneutical theory. Id. at 271.
22 See id. at 271, 533-34; see also Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621-22.
23 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 305 ("To acquire a
horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand.., in order...
to see it better .... ").
24 See id. at 265-307.
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Moreover, the text has its own horizon of meaning.25 That
horizon is influenced by the context or tradition in which it was
written, factors influencing or interpreting it over the passage of
time, the words used, and the context of the original author or
authors.26  Philosophical hermeneutics suggests that to
understand a text, a give and take must occur between the text
and the interpreter. It is a dialogue between one's being and the
object that one seeks to understand.27  This conversation
transforms both the text and the interpreter as they engage in
the exchange.28
The interpreter must necessarily project his or her own
horizon into the interpretive process and must also reflect upon
it and the horizon of the text.29 The horizon of the text has a
binding quality because when an interpreter openly enters into
dialogue with the text, the horizon of the text will limit the range
of pre-understandings the interpreter can consistently project.30
Because the text and the interpreter are engaged in a dialogue to
reach a common truth, neither the text nor the interpreter are
the sole source of meaning.
Unlike some earlier hermeneutic thinkers, Gadamer does
not seek a scientific methodology for interpreting texts and
experiences. 31 In fact, he sees the quest for such absolute
methods as interfering with the process of interpretation by
obfuscating what is really occurring. It is not that interpretive
methodology is useless, but rather that it does not do what it
purports to do, that is, reach an objective and unquestionable
meaning. The process of reaching meaning requires a constant
dialogue between the text or object, and the interpreter. Thus,
this process contains a subjective element. This subjectivity,
however, is mediated by tradition.32
25 See id. at 369-70.
26 See id. at 370, 374-75; GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,
supra note 20, at 98 (suggesting that this may actually be an under-inclusive list).
27 This dialogue is central to Gadamer's theory of interpretation in TRUTH AND
METHOD, supra note 3.
28 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 265-66.
29 See id. at 267 ("A person who is trying to understand a text is always
projecting.").
30 See id.; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 627.
31 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 266-67, 276-77. Use of
the term "context" instead of tradition, however, is preferred for reasons explained
below. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74:731
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Significantly, Gadamer does not believe that the lack of a
clear interpretive method prevents one from reaching truth or
understanding. It simply demonstrates that truth can be
variable when different texts and interpreters engage in the
hermeneutic dialogue, or when that dialogue is engaged in over
time by the same interpreter. Contrary to the suggestions of
some critics, this is not a form of relativism in which all
interpretations are seen as equal and correct.33 Interestingly, it
rejects relativism in the sense that through a proper dialogue
between the text and the interpreter, one can reach a better
understanding of the text than one who simply assigns a
reflexive meaning to the text and does not engage in such
dialogue. Thus, while there is no clear interpretive method in
Gadamerian hermeneutics, there is a better method for text and
interpreter to interact to reach a meaning that is both consistent
with the text and cognizant of the role the interpreter plays in
reaching that meaning.
An illustration from the legal arena will be useful to enable
the reader to apply this theory to law school missions in the next
section, and to demonstrate that while this theory may seem
abstract, it actually has practical significance. 34 This example is
provided by the interpretive concepts of textualism and "plain
meaning," which are sometimes utilized in constitutional and
statutory construction. The hermeneutic theory discussed in this
article suggests that the "plain meaning" of a law may not be
nearly as "plain" as a court presumes, and that the methods
ascribed to textualism do not lead to the "true" meaning of the
text being interpreted-although they may be a useful part of
the dialogue in appropriate cases.
This should not come as a shock given the fact that there are
many cases in which "plain" meaning was divined in a five to
four opinion of the Supreme Court overturning an opinion of an
appeals court panel or state supreme court.35 In such cases, five
33 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 142 ("Those who talk about relativism
presuppose that there could be a truth without the horizon of this conversation-
that is, an absolute truth separate from our questions.").
34 Gadamer himself sees hermeneutics as a practical philosophy. See generally
GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, supra note 20; HANs-GEORG
GADAMER, Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task, in GADAMER, REASON
IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 113.
35 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 55-63 (1993)
(documenting a capital punishment case on the interpretation of jury instructions).
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Justices may find on the face of a statutory provision that it is
only subject to one interpretation, despite the fact that four other
Justices, and a number of lower court judges did not find the
meaning that was gleaned to be plain.36 Moreover, once plain
meaning is found, courts generally do not look at legislative
history, context, or administrative interpretations, even when
these sources provide direct evidence that the supposedly plain
meaning was not intended by the authors of the statutory
provision and is not the most logical interpretation of it in
context.37 It has been suggested with some force that in these
cases, plain meaning is used as an allegedly objective
methodology to justify a decision reached for other reasons.
Hermeneutic theory seeks to understand these other reasons
and provide a basis for a dialogue between the judge or judges,
as interpreter, and the statutory or constitutional provision, as
text, which will enable a more open and honest interpretation.
To do so, one must look to the horizon and context/tradition of
the text, and apply it to the situation at hand-all while
understanding and acknowledging that in applying it, we are
mediating it through our own lens, which is influenced by our
personal contexts and traditions.
The use of tradition in Gadamerian hermeneutics has been
the subject of a great deal of controversy. 38 After all, if Gadamer
were suggesting that tradition set the boundaries for
interpretation, there would be significant limits on the ability of
those outside a given tradition, or those oppressed and
marginalized by it, to effectuate change. Jiirgen Habermas has
criticized Gadamer on this very point.39  Habermas is a
36 See id.
37 An excellent example of this is provided by Sutton v. United Airlines, 527
U.S. 471 (1999). This decision was severely criticized for failing to consider these
factors in Frank S. Ravitch & Marsha B. Freeman, The Americans With "Certain"
Disabilities Act: Title I of the ADA and the Supreme Court's Result Oriented
Jurisprudence, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 119 (2000).
38 See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-32 (providing a general overview of the
major attacks on Gadamer's theory). This article will only focus on the controversy
between Gadamer and Jiirgen Habermas. An excellent overview of this debate is
contained in BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 152-64, and Jiirgen Habermas, The
Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 181 [hereinafter
Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality].
39 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 155 (criticizing Gadamer's reluctance to
engage in abstract thinking); Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality,
supra note 38.
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proponent of critical hermeneutics and the critique of ideology,
which seeks, among other things, to understand the role of social
hierarchy and bias, and to empower people to overcome such
stratification. As Paul Ricoeur succinctly put it:
The gesture of hermeneutics is a humble one of acknowledging
the historical conditions to which all human understanding is
subsumed in the reign of finitude; that of the critique of
ideology is a proud gesture of defiance directed against the
distortions of human communication. By the first, I place
myself in the historical process to which I know that I belong;
by the second, I oppose the present state of falsified human
communication with the idea of an essentially political freedom
of speech, guided by the limiting idea of unrestricted and
unconstrained communication.40
Therefore, Gadamer's reliance on tradition is naturally
troubling for Habermas. Indeed, if Habermas' initial concerns
about Gadamer's use of tradition were accurate, the implications
would be troubling for many who support Gadamer's approach-
including Gadamer.
As it turns out, however, Gadamer's use of tradition is not
nearly as conservative as Habermas initially thought.4 1
Gadamer does not see tradition as an insurmountable barrier,
but rather, as a reality that influences interpretation, one which
must be understood to effectuate change.42 If one really wants to
effect change, one must be cognizant of the factors that influence
the current system-to Gadamer, tradition is the biggest such
factor. The debate between Gadamer and Habermas forced
Gadamer to clarify this, and ironically demonstrated that the
two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.4 3
Ricoeur has done a truly brilliant job of demonstrating this.44
Thus, "tradition" in the context of Gadamerian hermeneutics
40 RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 87.
41 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-35 (explaining the shift within
hermeneutic philosophy to include the claim of universality propounded by
Habermas); see also RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note
19, at 63 (explaining how hermeneutic philosophy goes beyond social science and
into philosophy in general); Eskridge, supra note 3, at 630-32.
42 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 269-70 (explaining that
tradition is part of the understanding of text, not a hindrance).
43 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 131-33 (stating that Gadamer believed that
tradition could be used to help understand the current context).
4 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at
87-100 (explaining the role of tradition in contemporary hermeneutics).
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is not an absolute boundary to interpretive possibilities. Instead,
it is a significant factor in shaping the horizons of both the text
and the interpreter, a factor that is necessarily injected into the
interpretive process-the dialogue between text and interpreter.
Gadamer learned this from Heidegger who asserted that "our
existence is inherently contextual-we are 'thrown' into a pre-
existent world-our understanding is conditioned by the
traditions of the world into which we are thrown." 5 Thus
[a] person who is trying to understand a text is always
projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as
soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text.... [Tihe
initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text
with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning.46
The interpreter seeks to work out his pre-understandings in
light of the text. Thus, the interpreter does not seek to simply
confirm his pre-understandings, but rather, to determine which,
if any, of the pre-understandings are consistent with the horizon
of the text. 47 This can only occur through a reflective dialogue
between the text and the interpreter, where the interpreter is
willing to give up pre-understandings that do not work out in
light of the text.48
Perhaps it is a result of my own horizon when I read
Gadamer, but I prefer the term "context" to the term "tradition."
Tradition implies something that necessarily comes from the
past, but when one reads Gadamer, it is apparent that tradition,
as he uses that term, is influenced by present context as well.49
Tradition shapes our present, but present circumstances shape
the path of tradition. Moreover, in our pluralistic, complex, and
ever-changing society, with almost unlimited access to
information, context may be a more accurate term. Like
Gadamer's use of the term tradition, context includes, but is not
limited to, our social context, biases, and preferences. Even if it
is only a matter of semantics, context seems a better term,
especially in light of the concerns raised by Habermas.
45 Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621 (citing GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 3, at 265-71).
46 GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 267.
47 See id. at 269 (stating that the reader of the text is waiting for the text to tell
him something and apply it to what he or she already believes or knows).
48 See id. at 269 ("The hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of
things.").
49 See id. at 266-68.
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Therefore, in this article I sometimes use the term "context" in
place of the word "tradition."
In his wonderful article, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation,
William Eskridge, Jr. provides an excellent summary of the
interpretive dialogue envisioned by Gadamer, noting that
[jiust as the horizon of the text changes over time, partly
through interpretive encounters, so too the interpreter's
viewpoint, or horizon, is transformed in the encounter. The
historical conditioning of our understanding does not preclude
revising our pre-understandings in light of the text. The
dynamic process of interpretation works thus: Upon our first
approach to the text, we project our pre-understandings onto it.
As we learn more about the text, we revise our initial
projections, better to conform with the presumed integrity of
the text as it unfolds to us. Essential to the interpreter's
conversation with the text is her effort to find a common ground
that will both make sense out of the individual parts of a text
and integrate them into a coherent whole. The assumption that
the text has something to teach us, therefore, exercises a
constraining influence on interpreters.50
The dialogue between text and interpreter enables the
interpreter to shed biases and pre-understandings that are
inconsistent with the horizon of the text, but the remaining
horizon of the interpreter has a similar impact on the possible
meanings of the text. Thus, the dialogue is a two way process:
The horizon of the interpreter influences the meaning of the text
and the horizon of the text limits the range of pre-
understandings the interpreter can project that will work out in
light of the text.
B. Ricoeur
As noted above, my discussion of Ricoeur's work will focus
only upon the ways in which Ricoeur's concept of interpretation
helps explain and mediate some of the concerns raised by
Gadamer's theory. Given the purpose of the present discussion,
this is appropriate, but it is essential to point out that Ricoeur's
work is much richer and deeper than the small piece of it
discussed in this article may suggest.51 If all Paul Ricoeur had
done in the discourse of hermeneutics was clarify the nature of
50 Eskridge, supra note 3, at 627.
51 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Gadamer's work in light of Habermas' criticisms, and thus to an
extent, mediate the perceived conflict between philosophical
hermeneutics and the critique of ideology, his contribution would
have been significant.52 This, however, is only a small piece of
his body of work in this area-a body of work that could be called
exceptional rather than merely significant. 53
In mediating the dispute between Habermas and Gadamer,
it is clear that Ricoeur has significant differences with the
traditionalism he sees in Gadamerian hermeneutics.54  He
acknowledges that this does not make hermeneutics inherently
conservative and tradition-preserving, nor does it make it a bar
to an emancipatory goal.55 Habermas' critique of Gadamer
suggests that the role of tradition in his hermeneutics precludes
a critique of ideology, for if we are constrained by our tradition in
interpreting the world around us, we will not see the oppression
wrought by our ideology.56  Ricoeur explains that this
supposed tension may be nothing more than a "straw-man;"
in fact, philosophical hermeneutics and its focus upon
tradition may not conflict with a critique of ideology and
emancipatory goals.57
In addressing this supposed conflict, Ricoeur initially notes:
I hasten to say that no plan of annexation, no syncretism, will
preside over this debate. I readily admit, along with Gadamer,
that each of the two theories speaks from a different place; but
I hope to show that each can recognise the other's claim to
universality in a way which marks the place of one in the
structure of the other.58
Later in the same essay, Ricoeur addresses why it may be
consistent to focus upon the past and cultural
influence/tradition, as well as an ideology of emancipation from
the domination of oppressive ideologies:
52 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at
87-100 (indicating that each school of thought raises its own legitimate claims).
53 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 217-56 (explaining the importance of
Ricoeur's work and including a translation of one of his works).
54 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at
87-95.
55 See id. at 87-100.
56 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-35; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 630-32.
.7 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at
96-97.
58 Id. at 64.
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The task of the hermeneutics of tradition is to remind the
critique of ideology that man can project his emancipation and
anticipate an unlimited and unconstrained communication only
on the basis of the creative reinterpretation of cultural
heritage. If we had no experience of communication, however
restricted and mutilated it was, how could we wish it to prevail
for all men and at all institutional levels of the social nexus? It
seems to me that critique can be neither the first instance nor
the last. Distortions can be criticised only in the name of a
consensus which we cannot anticipate merely emptily, in the
manner of a regulative idea, unless that idea is exemplified;
and one of the very places of exemplification of the ideal of
communication is precisely our capacity to overcome cultural
distance in the interpretation of works received from the past.
He who is unable to reinterpret his past may also be incapable
of projecting concretely his interest in emancipation. 59
If, as Ricoeur suggests, we engage in a "creative
reinterpretation" of our cultural heritage, the implications for
present purposes are significant. In the course of the dialogue
between text and interpreter,60 the law school community, as
interpreters, might reinterpret the mission statement in light of
some overriding concern with the ideology underlying it. If such
a creative reinterpretation were totally inconsistent with the
horizon of the text, this would directly conflict with Gadamer's
approach, but as Ricoeur implies, the horizon of the
interpreter(s) may allow for creative reinterpretation of a text
that is consistent with both its horizon and current social
concerns, and which may call into question the ideology
underlying the text.
The debate between Habermas and Gadamer, and Ricoeur's
attempt to demonstrate common ground, are far less important
in the context of law school mission statements. It is
worthwhile, however, to include this discussion of Ricoeur
because a discussion of Gadamerian hermeneutics is likely to
raise some of the concerns expressed by Habermas. Because few
in the legal community are familiar with Gadamer, it is
important to anticipate and address such concerns with his
emphasis on tradition in advance because, as he and Ricoeur
point out, that emphasis is not at all inconsistent with change or
59 Id. at 97.
60 It should be noted here that Ricoeur does not necessarily see the process of
interpreting a written text as one of dialogue. See id. at 91.
20001
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
emancipatory goals. In fact, the hermeneutic approach might
facilitate those goals. As noted in the preceding paragraph, this
creates a broader conception of the possibilities opened up by the
interpretive process than that which a reader might experience if
she were only exposed to Gadamer's initial framing of the
concept in Truth and Method.61  Again, quoting Ricoeur:
"[N]othing is more deceptive than the alleged antinomy between
an ontology of prior understanding and an eschatology of
freedom [between Gadamer's concept of the role of tradition and
Habermas' focus upon overcoming oppression and domination].
We have encountered these false antinomies elsewhere: as if it
were necessary to choose between reminiscence and hope!"62
C. The Implications of Hermeneutic Theory in the Present
Context
Hermeneutic theory is ideal for understanding the failure of
many schools to realize their missions, and it also provides a
means for interpreting those missions in order to enable their
realization in the modern context. Some schools may have
mission statements that, at least on paper, seem out of touch
with the current realities facing the law school, its faculty, and
students.63 In addition, outside influences such as accrediting
bodies may affect the ways in which schools carry out their
missions. 64  Indeed, if schools look at the text of a mission
statement alone, the stated mission might seem impossible to
achieve, out of date, or overly broad in the world of the twenty-
first century law school. This may lead to a view that the
mission statement is simply advisory or an unattainable "wish-
list" of sorts.
When a school operates day-to-day while ignoring the
existence of its mission, that school has lost an opportunity to
define itself, its goals, and the changes it wants to make in the
world and in the lives of its faculty and students. This latter
point is especially important for religious schools, regardless of
61 In this regard it should be noted that Gadamer himself opposed such a
cramped conception of the interpretive process. See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-
35.
62 RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 100.
63 See generally Barkan, supra note 1.
64 See id. at 249 (suggesting this influence is a factor to one degree or another,
with some seeing it as a factor secondary to more informal challenges facing these
schools).
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whether the mission reflects a specific religious heritage or
simply a distinct ethical commitment.65
Through the give and take between the mission text and the
text's interpreter (the current law school administrator,
professor, or student), a mission can be revitalized by
maintaining its core values, while at the same time avoiding
unnecessary conflict with the horizon of the interpreter. The
interpreter is prevented from ignoring the text of the mission
statement by the horizon of the text, but at the same time can
interpret the mission statement so that it is consistent with
evolving social context and reality.66 In this way, a school can
realize its mission even as times change. The mission does not
become obsolete because it is not textually absolute.
Another implication of hermeneutic theory to law school
mission statements involves the drafting or revision of mission
statements. In writing the text of a mission statement, a school
is shaping, although not absolutely determining, the horizon of
the mission statement. Naturally, the drafters of mission
statements are careful about the goals they seek to express. If
they draft a statement too narrowly, it might be ignored after
time for the reasons set forth in the next section. Conversely, if
it is drafted too broadly, the horizons of different interpreters
over the years could easily lead to interpretations inconsistent
with the drafter's core objectives-from a hermeneutic
perspective, there is nothing necessarily wrong with this. The
drafters should consider focusing on the core values they seek to
infuse into the mission, and draft the statement so that these
core values infuse it throughout; yet it should be drafted broadly
enough to allow the manner in which those values are realized to
change over time.67
An excellent example of the requisite balance is the Barry
University mission statement. It contains a core of important
65 By "distinct ethical commitment," I mean a mission statement at a
religiously affiliated law school that does not reflect a sectarian mission, but does
reflect a religious dimension and/or a distinct commitment to ethics and making the
world a better place.
66 See supra Part I.A.
67 While the passage of time and the horizon of future interpreters might alter
the intended meaning of the drafters, if those drafters understand the hermeneutic
dialogue that will be engendered by the text, they can try to shape the horizon of the
text in a manner that will project a somewhat consistent conception of core values
into future dialogues with interpreters.
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values such as a commitment to ethics, serving the under-served,
a religious dimension, and so forth. Furthermore, the mission
statement is worded broadly enough to allow these goals to be
achieved in a variety of ways as times change and pluralism
increases. 68 This enables the core values to be an inescapable
aspect of the horizon of the text while allowing interpreters with
differing horizons to understand the text and make it their own
over time. 69 The way the core values are lived and effectuated
may change, but those changes do not erase the core values
themselves. While some of the words of the mission statement
could be subject to a much narrower reading, the text as a whole
and the horizons of those who have interpreted it over the years
make such a reading inconsistent with the text as a whole.
While Barry is a Catholic university, the ethical
commitment and religious dimension reflected in the mission
statement are augmented by a commitment to diversity that
enables the school to welcome faculty and students from a
diverse array of faiths or no faith at all. We share a commitment
to ethical behavior and helping those in need, and our diversity
enhances these goals. Thus, while I am Jewish and rather
liberal, I am, along with all my colleagues, part of Barry's
inclusionary mission. We are not marginalized-that would be
inconsistent with the caring environment aspect of the mission.
Thus, despite our differing horizons, we can "live the mission"
68 The core of the Barry University Mission Statement is as follows: "The
primary purpose of Barry University, as stated in the Charter, is to offer students a
quality education. Furthermore, Barry commits itself to assuring a religious
dimension and to providing community service and presence within a more caring
environment." Barry University Mission (visited Feb. 1, 2001)
<http'//www.barry.edu/About-BU/misaccre.htm>.
69 A recent example of this is the addition of the law school to Barry University.
The law school is diverse both in terms of students and faculty. A number of the
faculty and students, including myself, are not Catholic or even Christian. We can
embrace the mission, however, because from the start it was clear that Barry is less
concerned about what faith you are than about how you live your life. Do you really
care about making a difference in the community through your scholarship,
teaching, community service, or the like? Do you really care about providing a
quality legal education to your students and fostering a caring environment? These
are the questions that matter most, and the mission is interpreted to foster
creativity and diversity in the ways the mission is carried out. There has been
tremendous support for the clinical program and community service activities, and
the law school greatly encourages scholarship. For example, when one writes an
article that has the potential to help someone down the road, or engages in pro bono
work, or simply takes some extra time to help a struggling student, she is thereby
contributing to the mission.
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because of its inherent flexibility and the fact that the school has
continued to interpret the mission in a manner that maintains
the core values with such flexibility. Barry University, along
with other schools that successfully realize the ideals embodied
in their mission statements, is instinctively engaging in the
hermeneutic dialogue.
II. APPLYING HERMENEUTIC THEORY TO REALIZE THE
IDEALS CONTAINED IN LAW SCHOOL MISSION
STATEMENTS
At the First Conference of the Religiously Affiliated Law
Schools, held at Marquette University Law School in 1994, a
number of the participants pointed out the difficulties faced by
law schools, particularly religiously affiliated law schools, in
realizing their core missions.70  Some focused on internal
pressures such as economic concerns or shifts in the orientation
of faculty, administration, and students. 1 Others focused on
external pressures such as the requirements of accrediting
bodies, the larger university community, and the views of
peers.7 2 All of these factors could easily contribute to a school's
failure to realize its mission, especially if that mission is
perceived as being at odds with the current situation facing the
school. As I will suggest below, however, this need not be the
case, because the core values underlying the mission statement
may be realized if the mission statement is approached from a
hermeneutic perspective.
One caveat that should be noted here is that the suggestions
70 See generally, Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 78 MARQ. L.
REV. 247 (1995).
71 See Lynn R. Buzzard, A Christian Law School: Images and Vision, 78 MARQ.
L. REV. 267 (1995) (discussing how factors relating to identity and those relating to
environment are crucial in realizing the vision of a Christian law school, which is
usually distorted by each person's own perception of what a Christian law school
should be); Douglas Laycock, Academic Freedom, Religious Commitment, and
Religious Integrity, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1995) (discussing methods the schools
could employ to prevent shifts in faculty); Steven R. Smith, Accreditation and
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 361 (1995) (discussing how the
accreditation process affects religiously affiliated schools through afirmative action
and other programs).
72 See Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious
Diversity" Got To Do With It?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 427 (1995) (focusing specifically on
accrediting bodies). Other symposium participants considered accrediting bodies as
a secondary issue. See Buzzard, supra note 71; Laycock, supra note 71; Smith, supra
note 71.
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below might not be as useful for a religious institution with a
highly sectarian mission statement that is in tension with
modernity, and the issues facing law schools in the twenty-first
century. In such a case, the mission statement will foreclose
some of the give and take between text and interpreter.73 Of
course, the hermeneutic thought discussed in this article might
be useful even in the context of such a limiting mission
statement. While my application of hermeneutic theory in this
section helps to moderate between the interpreter living in the
present and a broadly designed text that may have been created
under a very different set of conditions, it could still moderate
between a much narrower text and the modern interpreter.
From a hermeneutic perspective, there are several key
possibilities that might explain why so many law schools have
trouble realizing their missions. One of the most obvious is the
absolute failure of dialogue between text and interpreter. If law
school administrators and others within the law school
community see the school's mission statement as out of touch
with current reality, they may simply ignore it. It then becomes
merely words on paper. If the law school community does not
engage in a dialogue with the text, there will be no opportunity
to glean the core values embodied in the mission statement or
their possible relevance to the school's current situation. Instead
of exploring whether there is a way to effectuate the core values
of the mission statement in light of the horizon of the modern
law school, the school will take the path of least resistance, and
over time, the mission statement becomes irrelevant.
Another possibility is that the school does remember its
mission, and instead of attempting to engage in an ongoing
dialogue with the mission statement to carry it on through time,
the school sees it as an unattainable "wish list," or as simply a
suggestion. Perhaps even more cynically, a school may see it as
nothing more than a marketing tool. Such a school may
sometimes act consistently with its mission, but there is no
concerted attempt to realize that mission or to understand the
73 This give and take will be foreclosed unless the interpreter seeks to
"creatively reinterpret" the mission statement because of a concern that it embodies
an ideology inconsistent with the current goals of the school and/or social
conscience, and the horizon of the text does not foreclose the possibility of such a
creative reinterpretation (which would require an exceptionally narrow and closed
ended text). See supra text accompanying notes 59-62 (discussing creative
reinterpretation in the context of the Habermas/Gadamer debate).
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possibilities it opens up. This may be because the "wish list"
seems impossible to achieve given the current realities facing the
school. Yet, as Gadamer suggests, only a rigid reading of the
text would preclude its horizon and that of the school from
coming together to give the text life despite ever-changing
circumstances. 74 There is nothing inconsistent with a mission
statement that is effectuated differently over time, so long as the
core values are realized. There is also nothing wrong with
reinterpreting those core values as the distance of time sheds
additional light on the possible range of meanings presented by
the text's horizon.75 The key is that neither the text nor the
interpreter can be taken out of the search for meaning.
Unfortunately, because the current context facing a school
might make the text of the mission statement seem alien, or
unattainable, there may be no ongoing dialogue between the text
and the interpreter. The text may be seen as absolute and
problematic. For example, the current law school community,
including administrators, faculty, and students, may feel the
mission statement must be interpreted based on the intent of its
drafters who are known to have had a more narrow view of its
meaning. This historically embedded belief may be projected
into the text and limit the possibilities the text could otherwise
open up.
All of this suggests why so many schools have not realized
their missions over time. Ultimately, when the interpreter does
not interact with the text, or views the text as outdated, useless,
or simply suggestive, it is easier to overlook the text altogether if
it appears to conflict with issues and context currently
confronting the interpreter. If, however, law schools, including
faculty, students, and administrators, are able to engage in a
give and take with the text, that text may be revitalized and
useful without losing its core aspirations.
What might this process look like? As suggested above,
when the interpreter initially engages with the text, the
interpreter is likely to project his or her pre-understandings onto
it 76 including biases that mission statements are not terribly
important, up to date, or practical. At the same time, the
74 See supra Part I.A.
75 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 297-99.
76 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text; see also supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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interpreter may hold other pre-understandings, that is, goals he
or she wants the school to achieve that may seem to conflict with
the mission. This includes concerns about current problems in
the local community, nationally, or internationally, that need to
be addressed, a view of the world that values diversity or does
not, etcetera. After carefully reviewing and reflecting upon the
text, the pre-understandings initially projected onto the text may
be revised if they do not agree with the text as it unfolds to the
interpreter.7 7 The interpreter must seek to find a common
ground with the text.7 8 In doing so, the interpreter's other pre-
understandings might find some consistency with underlying
values inherent in the mission statement when it is viewed as a
"coherent whole."
If there are parts of a statement that seem to conflict with
the horizon of the interpreter and the meaning of the statement
when read as whole, the interpreter will seek to integrate them
into the coherent whole. The interpreter will try to find some
common ground that allows the interpretation to proceed.7 9 If
this can not be done, the interpreter may need to reevaluate the
basis for common ground with the text and continue the dialogue
to reach such a goal. Even if the statement seems to embody an
ideology inconsistent with the goals of the school or one that
might marginalize groups that the school seeks to welcome, the
text could be creatively reinterpreted by exposing and rejecting
the imposing ideology. At the same time, it may discover and
effectuate other values that are consistent with the school's
current horizon and social conscience. In this case, as Ricoeur
suggested, by critically evaluating the "tradition," the interpreter
can identify and challenge the oppressive ideology embodied in
it,80 and through creative reinterpretation, continue the life of
the text. If the mission statement turns out to be truly incapable
of standing on common ground with the interpreter's horizon, it
could be amended, still rendering the dialogue productive.81
77 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at
97.
81 The interaction between text and interpreter will have found a meaning for
the text that requires amendment to fulfill the school's mission as viewed by the
interpreter, in this case, the interpretive community of the school. Still, the mission
statement will have been acknowledged and thought about. The end result will be a
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The text constrains the possible range of interpretations the
interpreter can give the mission statement, but the horizon of
the interpreter may expand the possibilities created by the
text.8 2 Thus, the process of dialogue between the law school and
its mission statement can open up possibilities for realizing the
stated mission that would not have seemed possible if the
statement were viewed as textually absolute, either because of
the perceived intent of its drafters or the words used. It is
axiomatic in the philosophical hermeneutic context that the
subjective intent of, or the words used by, the drafters does not
absolutely dictate the possibilities opened up by the text.8 3 The
text must be interpreted in such a way to give it life, and in the
act of interpretation both the text and the interpreter are
transformed.8 4 Therefore, law school missions can be realized
differently over time.
This is not simply theory. Think about a school that has
made no effort to realize its stated mission in recent years. It
may be doing some things consistent with that mission, but it
has not directly sought to fulfill it. If the school continues to
ignore the mission, it loses the opportunity to interpret it, but if
the school seeks to engage its mission in dialogue, it may find
consistency between some of its institutional values/concerns
and those reflected in the mission. From this common ground,
the school can continue the dialogue with its mission statement
so that the core values embodied therein can be effectuated in
the school's current context. The result may not be exactly what
the drafters of the statement intended yet it could still be
consistent with their underlying intent. Because the drafters
may not have foreseen the factors influencing the school's
horizon, there is no reason their specific intent should govern the
dialogue.8 5 Rather their broader intent, the core values, may be
realized over time.8 6 If nothing else, the process of engaging the
new mission statement capable of being carried out; a mission statement that may
have never come into existence but for the dialogue between its predecessor and the
interpretive community.
82 See supra Part I.A.
83 See supra Part I.A; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-25.
84 See supra Part I.A.
85 See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-25. This is also reflected in Gadamer's
understanding of the dialogue between text and interpreter, temporal distance, and
"meta-intent." Id.
86 See id.
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mission statement in dialogue of the sort envisioned by Gadamer
should stimulate ideas and foster constructive discourse.
CONCLUSION
A world of possibilities opens up when schools actively seek
to engage in dialogue with their mission statements. As
Gadamer suggested, an interpreter must be willing to engage the
text in dialogue in order to understand it. In the context of law
school mission statements, such dialogue would be useful
because it will force each school to think about its mission and
what it means, and can mean, to the school today. As Gadamer
might say, the dialogue would unfold the world of possibilities
raised by the text. Moreover, the dialogue will enable schools
grappling with the task of realizing their missions over time to
determine what those missions mean both in light of the text of
the mission statement and the continually evolving context of
the school.
Schools that have not tried to realize their missions might
find the concepts described herein a useful way to begin the
process. For those that have partially realized their missions,
the hermeneutic approach offers the possibility of understanding
those missions better, so that they can be further realized
despite changing circumstances and dynamics. Finally, for
schools that are effectively realizing their missions, hermeneutic
philosophy provides the hope of continued realization of those
aspirations well into the future. One thing is certain, if schools
do not interact at all with their mission statements, those
statements are mere words on paper, and will almost certainly
never be realized.
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